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BOOK REVIEWS
READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY. By Morris R. Cohen and Felix S. Cohen. Prentice Hall,
Inc., New York, 1951. Pp. xvi, 944, $8.50.
The late Professor Morris R. Cohen, illustrious philosopher, educator
and humanist, had at least two great intellectual and scholarly goals. The
first was to compile an anthology of appropriately arranged excerpts,
selected from the works of the world's most famous philosophers and
jurists. The second was to write "a comprehensive treatise on legal
philosophy which would constitute a companion volume." 1 The treatise
was partially written by Morris insofar as he concluded his three volumes
of essays, entitled Law and the Social Order, The Faith of a Liberal, and
Reason and Law, but it was never completed.2 The anthology which
Morris began as a joint enterprise with his distinguished son, Felix, likewise was realized only in part during the former's lifetime. But it has
now been brought to fruition by Felix, in the volume under review, as an
act of filial devotion, with the hope that it may be found worthy of his
father's "comprehensive and penetrating vision." 8 In lieu of the proposed
treatise and by way of partial compensation, more than twenty per cent
of the volume is made up of the writings of father and son, and Julius
Stone's Province and Function of Law (1946) has been recommended by
Felix as a suitable, supplemental volume. 4
Like Jerome Hall's Readings in Jurisprudence (1938) and Simpson
and Stone's Cases and Readings on Law and Society (three volumes,
1948-49), this volume makes available, in convenient form, a wide range
of readings "not only for browsing but also for use as a course text and
as a beginner's introduction to the main currents of legal thought." 5 Like
these two preceding works, it adopts the comparative, "case-book" method
of presenting the subject. But unlike the first of these two anthologies,
which makes ideal the controlling mould, and unlike the second, which
regards society as supplying the dominant pattern, the volume under review has sought to arrange the materials within the ultimate framework
of fact, function, and problem-solving.
While "this volume seeks to exhibit in their working clothes the ideas
that compete for the future loyalties of free men," 6 maximum attention is
1. Preface vii.
2. Ibid.
3. Preface viii.
4. Id. at vii.
5. Ibid.
6. Preface iv.
(428)
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directed toward the "working clothes" of the ideas, rather than to the
ideas themselves. In other words, the emphasis is not so much upon the
ideals which great jurists and legal philosophers professed or rejected,
but rather upon the manner in which they applied those ideals, or failed
to do so, in the solution of problems affecting the well-being of their own
contemporary societies.7 Justification for this emphasis was found in the
teaching experience of the co-editors. Thus the functional approach
"struck sparks," 8 and proved congenial in the classes which Felix taught
at the Yale Law School and the City College of New York.9
The fact-functional design of this book is manifest from the selection
of the authors whose works have been included, from the amount of
space which has been accorded their writings, and from the arrangement
of the materials. It is further evident from rejection of the school method
of presenting the subject. This method has been described as encouraging
the view that jurisprudence is "a maze of inert ideas, a museum of intellectual curiosities far removed from logic or practice." "D
The volume is made up of excerpts from the writings of more than
a hundred celebrated jurists, philosophers, economists, political scientists,
and historians, ranging from the sixth century, B.C., to the present time.
Most of these authors were mainly preoccupied with the problem-solving
phase of the legal order, either on the basis of a relative and mutable
idealism, as Roscoe Pound, or on that of experimentation, physical power,
or sheer utility, as Holmes and Bentham. Thus Pound," the moft
featured author aside from the co-editors themselves, commands more than
fifty pages. About twenty pages are devoted to the writings of Holmes,
and approximately forty pages to the works of Bentham, both utilitarians.
Greater space and more prominent positions have been given to
materials which accentuate facts (actuality) rather than principles or
ideals (metaphysics). A fact-functional approach may be seen from the
relative space and position which have been accorded legal-social institutions and legal-general philosophy, respectively. Thus 587 pages are
devoted to legal-social institutions and only 340 pages to legal-general
philosophy. A total of 366 pages has been assigned to the discussion of
legal institutions including property (nature, types, origin, and justification) ; contract (nature, types, social roots, and enforceable promises);
torts (definition, liability, damage, causation, and compensation); and
crime and punishment (nature, cause, procedure, responsibility, purpose,
individualization, and alternatives). This discussion takes place in Part I.
The topic of social institutions comes next in importance with 221 pages,
covering the subjects of history, anthropology, economics, and politics.
7. Ibid.*
8. Id. at vi.
9. Ibid.
10. Preface v.
11. Dillard, Book Review, Readings in}Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy
(1951), by Cohen and Cohen, 38 VA. L. Rav. 703, 706, 707 (1952).
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This topic is treated in Part IV, so that final position of climax is given
to it. Only 160 pages are allotted to the topic of the general theory of
law, i.e., the nature of law, the nature of the judicial process, and legislation, which is dealt with in Part II. The topic of the general philosophy
is not reached until Part III, which covers logic, ethics, and metaphysics
in 180 pages.
The book does not purport to cover the whole field of the positive
law. Only those areas of that law which have provoked the chief controversies over the centuries have been considered. For example, the
law of the family, of the corporation, and of decedents' estates was not
regarded as falling within the highly controversial category, and hence
12
was not included.
Consistent with the policy of presenting legal philosophy and jurisprudence principally from the point of view of fact and function, neither
the authors nor their writings have been classified into schools, for this
would imply that the most important factor was the conflict of the
schools. On the contrary, Felix maintains that "the history of law, its
logical analysis, the scientific study of its social consequences, and the
evaluation of those consequences" Is should be viewed "as related problems
posed by a common subject matter," 14 i.e., the distinctive methods of the
various schools should be combined in the search for the answers to
questions presented by society.
Jurisprudence and legal philosophy should deal with the study of the
interaction of four basic factors, as related to law, namely: reason, experience, function, and physical power. Each of these factors may be
considered in terms of its formalistic (methodological) or substantive
(idealistic) aspects. The schools of jurisprudence have correctly emerged
in recognition of the existence of these four factors, the Philosophical
School emphasizing reason; the Historical, experience; the Sociological
and Realist, function; and the Analytical, physical power. But at times
the proponents of a particular school have failed to distinguish between
method and ideal, or have stressed one method or one ideal to the exclusion
of all the others.
The volume under review merits unstinted commendation for insisting upon the integrative character of the methods of the schools. It is
necessary for the student of jurisprudence to know that these methods are
complementary and not conflicting, although at times they have been so
exhibited, erroneously. But conflict does exist in regard to the substantive
aspects of the schools, especially as to the nature of moral right and
wrong, if any. It is just as important, if not more so, to be aware of this
conflict, as it is to know that the methods of the schools do not conflict, in
12. Friedmann, Book Review, Readings in lurisprudence and Legal Philosophy
(1951), by Cohen and Cohen, 40 CALIF. L. RZv. 325 (1952).
13. Preface v.
14. Ibid.
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order to dispel the impression that in every instance "radically different
views of the same fact may be equally correct." 15
The book correctly rejects the school method of approaching jurisprudence and legal philosophy insofar as it has been the occasion of
pinning exact and categorical labels on specific jurists. Such labels may
be little more than "classificatory caricatures." 16 But again it is a matter
of abusing the school method, for undesirable results are not inevitable
if this method is restricted to the classification of the ideas found in juridical
materials regardless of their authorship.
Commendable too is the book's objective to promote good will, friendship and understanding among all persons working in a common sphere,
for indeed the study of jurisprudence and legal philosophy is "a great cooperative adventure, pursued across many centuries by men of many races
and many faiths." 17 This conception of juridical study will provide
"perspectives through which the many-faceted problems of the law may
be viewed." I But the purpose of acquiring this perspective is to enable
the student to make an ultimate choice of truth, as dictated by a rightly
and fully informed conscience.
Neither a spirit of professional comradeship, nor the overcoming of
misunderstanding among jurists by encouraging the precise use of language and a common vocabulary can eliminate the underlying idealistic
and conceptualistic differences on the substantive level. It is true that
American jurists, for example, with widely differing starting points, as
to man, law, and society, may often agree upon the justice, wisdom, and
utility of a particular judicial decision or legislative enactment, but for
different reasons. 19 Although this unanimity as to result in specific instances is encouraging and should receive proper attention, nevertheless
it is also imperative to disclose the conflict which may arise, functionally
speaking, in extreme situations. These may never arise as long as the
present postulates of American civilization remain as they are, but events
abroad have demonstrated the potential fluidity of all national civilizations.
The study of the various ideals used in solving social problems should
make it possible to identify those which are undesirable or dangerous, and
the reasons for their being such. Juridical faith without good social
works, resulting from a fact-functional approach, is dead. But there can
be no assurance of the continuation of good works, especially when extraordinary situations arise, without a faith in the self-evident authority of
an extra-human moral order imposing inescapable duties. When problems
15.
16.
17.
18.

Preface iv.
Id. v.
Id. iv.
Ibid.

19. See papers presented at symposium held on February 25, 1950, at the College
of Law of Ohio State University. The speakers were: Dr. Felix S. Cohen, Dr.
Brendan F. Brown and Dr. Robert S. Hartman. These papers were published
in 12 OHIo ST. L.J. 1, 3-35 (1951).
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are solved on the basis of intrinsic falsity, great social damage will sooner
or later occur, as a penalty for doing violence to the nature of man and
things, as well as to what some jurists have described, for want of a
more accurate phrase, "natural law."
A jurist may admit a limited amount of absolute, immutable, moral
truth, and be largely concerned with the application of that truth to facts,
or he may deny the existence of such truth, or of all truth, for that matter,
and stress the need of doing something about improving the institutions
which serve men. Hence there are fundamentally different types of "legal
realists," 2 i.e., th6se ethically uninhibited, and those morally limited,
either by completely relativistic, or partly absolute norms, which may be
totally subjective or partially objective. The dichotomy between truth
and error would seem, therefore, to be more realistic than that between
"realism" and "idealism." 21
Brendan F. Brown.t

POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATESA COLLECTION OF LEGAL AND RELATED MATERIALS. By Thomas I. Emerson and David Haber, with a foreword
by Robert M. Hutchins. Dennis & Co., Inc., Buffalo, 1952.
Pp. 1209. $7.50.
Here is an important and provocative book. The authors have
crammed into its 1200-odd pages a prodigious collection of materials (both
case and textual) relating to the legal devices for protecting certain political
and civil rights. The problems covered are the right to security of the
person and federal protection thereof, fairness in criminal procedures, the
right of franchise, freedom of speech, academic freedom, freedom of religion and the separation of church and state, and racial discrimination.
Materials from every conceivable source have been used and the eye of the
reader is constantly directed outward from the limitations of the particular
case or statute to the realities of the problem involved.

The elaborate

bibliographical notes are themselves a major contribution because they
range far afield from conventional judicial, legislative and historical materials to bring in the literature of all the social sciences. At the end of
20. See Brown, Brendan F., A Scholastic Curriculum and Teaching Method
for The Catholic Law School in War Time, 10 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERsTry BJLETzIN
7 (1943), cited by REuscELEiN, JURISPRUDENCE-ITs AmERIcAN PROPHETS 222
(1951); also see FRANK, CouRTs ON TRIAL 364 (1950).

21. This handsomely bound book has several excellent special features. At the
beginning of each of the fourteen chapters, there are a topical summary of contents
and an introductory note by way of a general commentary on the subject matter,
therein contained. Numerous footnotes give short sketches of the authors. The
material has been made readily accessible by tables of contents and cases, respectively,
in the front of the book, and by a complete index at the end.

t Dean, School of Law, The Catholic University of America.
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the chapter on discrimination, for example, the authors cite almost a hundred books and articles dealing with the theory of race and caste, the
history and sociology of American minority groups, the social and psychological dynamics of prejudice, intergroup relations, and the personality
structure of oppressed groups. Everything in print relating to the subjects covered appears to have been at least referred to by the authors.
Certainly no lawyer with a professional interest in the civil and political
rights field can afford to be without this book on his shelves. Social
scientists also will find it invaluable. Its usefulness as a law school teaching tool, however, is apt to be severely limited by conflicting curricular
demands. Outside of specialized seminars few schools will be able to
afford the time necessary to teach this much material on such a narrow, if
important, range of subject matter.
Upon a first examination (the reviewer has not taught the materials)
the technical execution of the book appears to be excellent. One problem
of organization, however, may detract somewhat from its usefulness. The
authors state in their preface: "The materials have been organized in
terms of problems rather than of legal doctrine. Thus issues of freedom
of speech under the First Amendment, or 'state action' under the Fourteenth, run through a number of chapters. We have used this organization in order to emphasize the concrete issues at stake and to bring to bear
on those issues all relevant considerations, whether from legal or other
sources. In order to facilitate use of the book along doctrinal lines, however, we have striven to make the index as complete as possible." (P. xv)
The treatment of the "state action" materials highlights the problem.
Intelligent understanding of the new approaches being made to finding
state action requires careful consideration of a number of cases which
happen to deal with different civil rights. The materials on the subject
found at any one place in the book are inadequate and the reviewer doubts
that a reference to the index, which refers you from "State Action" to
"Fourteenth Amendment" and "Fifteenth Amendment" and there refers
to 20 different portions of the book, will enable either the lawyer or the
student to organize the materials for full understanding. Some compromise
with the strictly functional organization on this, and perhaps other issues,
would have been desirable.
More troublesome to this reviewer than such minor defects in execution are the basic assumptions which underlie the book. In the preface
the authors state: "The authors confess to a strong bias in favor of
political and civil rights. We have accepted throughout the assumptions
inherent in a system of democratic values. Within this framework, however, we have attempted to present the materials in an objective manner.
Our purpose has been to bring to the reader, so far as possible, the relevant
facts and the significant points of view, leaving it up to each individual to
make his own judgment." (P. xv) And it appears that they have made
a conscientious effort to present the conflicting points of view. But in
overall emphasis and approach the book seems to advocate a particular
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point of view '-a point of view based upon those "assumptions" which to
the authors are "inherent in a system of democratic values." This emphasis
no doubt is justified by the authors on the ground that there is general
agreement with their approach. Thus, they open the introduction with
the following (to this reviewer highly questionable) statement: "The
American people today are in broad agreement concerning the basic values
and fundamental principles of a democratic society." (P. v)
What are these "assumptions," these "basic values and fundamental
principles" upon which the book is based? Fortunately, the authors have
explained them in a ten-page introduction which should be "must" reading
for every user of the book. Only those portions of the explanation which
most trouble the reviewer will be referred to here. At one point the
authors refer to a post-World-War-II trend "in the direction of narrowing
or abrogating political and civil rights," (P. viii) and discuss the many
factors which they feel have contributed to this trend. Among those
factors are the following:
(1) "The principles of democratic freedom must now be applied
not in a context of laissez-faire, a free market, and the largely unregulated competition of numerous small and independent business
units, but in the context of regulated monopoly or semi-monopoly.
This means that the economic forces which originally sponsored and
fought for the principles of individual liberty against absolutist executive authority may find their interests today more on the side of
maintaining the status quo and hence leaning toward a closed society
than on the side of encouraging opportunities for change and hence
fostering an open society."
(P. ix)
(2) "Far-reaching state controls, accompanied by the inevitable
government bureaucracy, have become essential to the maintenance of
economic order and prosperity. Hence the problem is no longer the
relatively simple one of curbing unfair or oppressive actions of a state
machine with narrowly circumscribed functions, but rather of accepting and using a powerful and effective government apparatus while
at the same time holding it within bounds." (P. ix)
(3) In modern society greater social values "become attached
to orthodoxy and greater social deprivations assigned to deviation.
Thus the majority becomes more coalesced, more demanding of unity,
and the individual or the minority finds less toleration for non-conformities. Hence the maintenance of political and civil rights comes
to require not only a battle against government power but a struggle
against oppressive, non-governmental, majorities. In this contest the
1. This note of advocacy sounds most loudly in the chapter on Academic Freedom
but appears in less pronounced form throughout the book. Thus in the chapter on
Fairness in Governmental Procedures the factual background of the problems is
given by excerpts from the reports of the Wickersham Committee and the President's
Committee on Civil Rights; the very real problems of the police and the prosecutors
are scarcely mentioned.
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individual or minority group may actually look to the government
for aid." (P. x)
This reviewer (while he has not yet worked out satisfactorily his own
affirmative position) finds it impossible to accept the authors' conception
of the proper role of government in relation to the citizen. Too much
emphasis is placed upon rights 2-both rights to be protected against government and rights to call upon the government for affirmative assistance.
It is far too much to ask of any government that it assume the duty to
feed, clothe, medicate, and otherwise smooth the path from cradle to grave
and at the same time concede to each citizen the absolute right to bite the
hand which feeds him. And the concession made here (as in most current
"liberal" writing) of unchecked governmental power over economic affairs
may easily place in jeopardy the political and civil rights so stoutly defended. Indirect control through the pocketbook can be quite as effective
as direct suppression and against such control the "appeal to the ballot
box" may be even less efficacious than against more forthright oppression.
A stronger infusion of old-fashioned liberalism would have made the
book much more palatable to the reviewer and, he suspects, to many
others. In his view the conception of "liberty against government," properly defined and limited, has far greater promise for individual freedom
than the authors' conception of "political and civil rights."
Edward L. Barrett, Jr.t

DRAFTING WILLS AND TRUST AGREEMENTS. By Gilbert
T. Stephenson. Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1952.
Pp. 551. $10.00.
There are three stages in the preparation of a will. First, the process
of obtaining information concerning the type and value of the client's
property and his family history. Secondly, the process of determining
the best manner in which the client's wishes (as developed by the attorney
to cover contingencies the average client never has considered) can be
carried out. Finally, drafting the necessary documents. The first two
stages are generally combined under the heading of estate planning, which
today is of considerable importance due to the marital deductions pro2. Far too little consideration is given to the fact that in all civil right situations
a choice must be made between competing values. See Riesman, The Present State
of Civil Liberty Theory, 6 J. oF PoLiTrcs 323 (1944). Instead, the impression is left
that the claimant of a civil right is always entitled to protection-an assumption
which appears frequently in the current literature on this subject. Thus John Frank
in his annual series of excellent articles on the work of the United States Supreme
Court appraises justices in terms of the number of cases in which they have voted
for or against claimed civil rights. See, e.g., The United States Suprente Court:
1951-52, 20 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 1, 49-50 (1952).
t Professor of Law, University of California.
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vision of the Revenue Act of 1948. In view of this, the attorney in search
of material can readily find numerous articles, monographs, and even
treatises on the subject. However, a different situation is present with
respect to the subject of draftsmanship. When an attorney, completely
ignorant of the field, has been requested to prepare, let us say, an unfunded
life insurance trust agreement together with simple wills for husband and
wife feeding into the trust, where does he commence? Form books merely
provide the many varied clauses without any explanation concerning their
use or their meaning. Considerable help is afforded by the increased
number of lectures in draftsmanship given under the auspices of the
American Law Institute and other similar groups. However, for the
attorney who cannot avail himself of these avenues of education, there has
been up to this time no adequate treatise he could turn to.
Gilbert T. Stephenson's book supplies this missing link. As is stated
in the foreword, this is not a treatise on wills and estates, on estate planning, on taxation of trusts and estates, nor is it a form book. It is a discussion of the working provisions of wills and trust agreements. It contains some 600 forms of clauses together with five complete instruments,
a will, a living trust agreement, a personal insurance trust agreement, a
partner's insurance trust agreement and a stockholders insurance trust
agreement. It does not contain dispositive provisions. The book is
divided into separate chapters relating to the powers of executors and
trustees, their appointment and succession, their compensation, investment
provisions, tax provisions and the like. Since this is designed for national
distribution, the author very wisely emphasizes the fact that the discussion
as well as the forms are not based on the law of any particular jurisdiction
and accordingly, as is true of any form book, any clause utilized should be
reviewed in the light of the local laws. It is, therefore, particularly
attractive to the attorney without any experience in this field.
It is stated that the author some thirty-three years ago commenced a
collection of clauses of wills and trust instruments for his own use as a
practicing attorney. After he had entered the trust field, he continued
this collection, and this book is a result of an analysis of some 750 instruments. From this developed the course of lectures that has been given
by the author at the Graduate School of Banking, where he is Director of
Research, and over the period of 1937 to 1950 to more than 15,000 law
students in law schools all over the country.
The specialist in this field will be interested in comparing these clauses
with those he utilizes, since in some cases undoubtedly there will be an
improvement resulting from the manner of expression. Likewise, the
book with its excellent index may be of advantage to the specialist in permitting him to readily find a clause that is not normally used in the average
will and trust instrument.
To attempt to discuss the various clauses themselves would serve no
useful purpose. If any criticism is to be made, it would be based on the
absence of brevity. Today we find clients insisting upon wills which are
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short and are written in simple language. This often can be accomplished
merely through a revision of clauses that have been used for years. Thus,
the power vested in a trustee to invest in all forms of property without
restriction to legal investments is to be contrasted with the clause found
in the form of will in the book which requires twelve printed lines. In
fact, the paragraph of the will dealing with powers contains twenty-nine
separate sections and covers almost five printed pages.
In closing, note should be made of the chapter entitled "Omitted Provisions," which emphasizes matters that are often overlooked by the
draftsman. Thus, for example, there is the failure to dispose of tangible
personal property outright, rather than to have it included in a residuary
trust, and the failure to include a minor's clause permitting the trustee to
hold the share of any minor during minority, in lieu of having a guardian
appointed. These could be added to the check list that should be consulted in connection with the preparation of any will or trust agreement.
Charles M. Hamilton.t
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t Philadelphia Bar.

438

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 101

By Francis Biddle. Doubleday & Co., Inc.,
Garden City, N. Y., 1951. Pp. 255. $3.50.

THE FEAR OF FREEDOM.

By Paul Sayre. State
University of Iowa, 1951. Pp. 21. $1.50.
INTRODUCTION TO BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS. By Elvin R. Latly. PrenticeAN INTRODUCTION TO A PHILOSOPHY OF LAW.

Hall, Inc., New York, 1951.
INTRODUCTION

Pp. 646. $7.50.

TO THE STUDY OF

LAW.

By Bernard C. Gavit.

The

Foundation Press, Brooklyn, 1951.
LAND PLANNING LAW IN A FREE

vard University Press, 1951.
LAW AND SOCIETY IN

Pp. 388. $4.25.
SOCIETY. By Charles H. Haar. HarPp. 210. $4.00.
By P. E.

THE RELATIONS OF STATES.

Corbett.

Yale University Institute of International Studies, 1951. Pp. 337.
$4.75.
THE LAW OF NATIONS (2d Ed.). By Herbert W. Briggs. AppletonCentury-Crofts, Inc., New York, 1952.

Pp. 1108.

H. Ferguson and Charles LeeDecker.

$8.00.

By John
The Pennsylvania Municipal

MUNICIPALLY OWNED ELECTRIC PLANTS IN

PENNSYLVANIA.

Publication Service, State College, Pa., 1951.

Pp. 137.

$4.00.

THE NATURE AND TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS AND LossES.

By

Lawrence H. Seltzer. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1951.
Pp. 554. $7.50.
PLEADING AND JOINDER (Cases & Stats.). By Blume & Reed. PrenticeHall, New York, 1952. Pp. 684. $8.00.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. By Ruth C. Silva. University of Michigan
Press, 1951.

Pp. 213.

$3.50.

By Franklin H.
Pp. 563. $5.50.
PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER.
By Reed Dickerson.
Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1951. Pp. 339. $7.00.
THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION. By H. J. Sherman.
Exposition Press, 1952. Pp. 156. $3.00.
STATES' LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR. Compiled by Pauli Murray. Christian Service, 1950. Pp. 750. $4.00.
PRINCIPLES OF BUSINESS AND THE FEDERAL

LAW.

Cook. The MacMillan Co., New York, 1951.

TAX SAVINGS IN REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS.

Davenport, Iowa.

Bureau of Analysis,

National Institute of Real Estate Brokers of the

National Association of Real Estate Boards, Chicago, 1951. Pp. 93.
TAXATION AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY. By William H. Anderson.

Prentice-Hall, New York, 1951. Pp. 598. $6.00.
UNITED STATES ECONOMIC POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

Raymond F. Mikesell.
$4.75.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT.

McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1952.

By John P. Dawson.

Pp. 201. $4.50.
WAGE-HOUR LAW. By Herman A. Wecht.
delphia, 1951. Pp. 499. $15.00.

By

Pp. 341.

Little, Brown & Co.,

Boston, 1951.

Joseph M. Mitchell, Phila-

